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Introduction
Karen Baehler’s contribution to the previous edition of
this journal was a stimulating one in several respects
(Baehler, 2005). It provided a reminder of the timelessness
of the debate about the rationality of policy-making, gave
us something new to think about (the public argument
test), and offered a number of thoughtful points on the
subject of how far policy analysts should go in their
endeavours to do the right thing.
It also prompted the two of us to offer a modest
contribution of our own, not so much in relation to
the substantive points Baehler makes as in the interests
of further illuminating a particular aspect of them. One
way of  approaching the substance of  Baehler’s piece
is to see it as a commentary on the knotty matter of
reconciling Westminster conventions of  public service
neutrality with the brute political realities of executive
decision-making. The traditional protagonists, of
course, have been ministers and officials. But these days,
whether in Wellington or Westminster – or, for that
matter, in Canberra, Dublin or Ottawa – a third
element is increasingly in view: the political adviser.2
Ministerial advisers, as they are typically called in New
Zealand, are increasingly a feature of the executive
landscape. While there might be a tendency to assume
that they have popped out of the thickets of MMP
unannounced, in fact their advent in larger numbers
was anticipated – and planned for – in advance of the
first MMP election. Amongst others, Shroff (1995),
Smith (1995) and the State Services Commission (1994;
1995) all forecast a growing demand from ministers
for advice sourced from beyond the public service.
One or two notes of caution were sounded. The
Commission wondered how the relationship between
political staff  and public servants would be managed,
and whether the former would be bound by the
conventions governing the collective interest of the
government of  the day (State Services Commission,
1995, pp.73-74). But on the whole, the prospect was
considered an opportunity as much as a risk. Shroff
(1994, p.25), for instance, made the point that political
appointees in the Swedish Prime Minister’s Department
played an important role in co-ordinating the policies
of parties in coalition.
Whatever the etymology, the data indicate that as recently
as 1998 there were just 24 political staff (none of whom
were formally classified as ministerial advisers); by 2003
their number had risen to 43.3
Ministerial advisers generally attract a pretty poor press.
The stereotype is that of a partisan lackey intent on
advancing the minister’s political agenda at any and all
costs, and who is correspondingly immune to reasoned
policy debate, which is itself generally advanced by
equally reasoned public servants. Doubtless some
ministerial advisers may be like this, at least some of
the time. (Equally, there may be public service advisers
who are selective in the advice they tender, or who
craft advice around a pre-determined policy
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1 We gratefully acknowledge the contribution of the Marsden Fund,
administered by the Royal Society of New Zealand, whose support
enabled us to undertake the research referred to in this article.
2 Various jurisdictions use different terms to describe advisers
employed to provide a partisan perspective to ministers. Australians
talk about ministerial staff; in the United Kingdom (UK) references
are to special advisers. Here in New Zealand they are called
political advisers (Wintringham, 2002) or personal appointees
(James, 2002). Our preference is for ministerial advisers, which is
the formal classification most likely to attach to staff employed
by the Ministerial Services unit of the Department of Internal
Affairs to furnish advice, including advice of a partisan nature.
When we use the term ‘adviser’, we are referring to ministerial
advisers.
3 Data were obtained under the Official Information Act 1982, and
cover all those employed by Ministerial Services on events-based
contracts. They include senior advisers, advisers, press secretaries
and media assistants, but exclude executive assistants, who
generally perform administrative functions. A request for more
recent data is pending a response.
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preference.) But that is far from the whole story, and
the proposition advanced here is that advisers can assist
public servants to negotiate the tension between
theoretically rigorous and empirically informed advice,
which may be rejected for being insufficiently sensitive
to political imperatives, and inappropriately partisan
advice, which offends against core constitutional
conventions.
While we anticipate a measure of scepticism as an
inevitable response to this suggestion, there is evidence
to substantiate it. What is more, it comes from the upper
echelons of  the official family in Wellington, courtesy of
a large-scale survey undertaken in early 2005.4 Amongst
other things that exercise explored the extent of contact
between senior officials and ministerial advisers (a great
deal), assessed officials’ overall disposition towards
advisers (generally positive), and sought officials’ views
on the regulation of advisers (no limits on total numbers,
but a dedicated Code of Conduct, thanks). It also
confirmed what we had thought in a vaguely theoretical
sense might be the case, but had previously possessed
no empirical support for: that there is a solid core of
senior officials inclined to the view that ministerial advisers
not only add value to the policy process, but can be of
considerable assistance in maintaining and protecting the
neutrality of  public servants.
Setting the scene
Given the political imperatives which influence cabinet
decision-making, one of the challenges facing public
service advisers is the need to ensure that advice is
sensitive to ministers’ requirements without tipping over
into hopeless partisanship.
Baehler (2005) comes at this same issue from a particular
direction. In a discussion of the utility of the ‘public
argument test’ as a sort of decision-making criterion
for officials, she raises doubts as to whether – in the
heat of the policy kitchen – it is possible, much less
desirable, for officials to both divine their ministers’
political motives and retain an appropriate degree of
detachment. (Parenthetically, we might add that care
should be taken that the public argument test satisfies
the Westminster commitment to ‘a constitutional
bureaucracy with a non-partisan and expert civil service’
(Rhodes and Weller, 2005, p.7). There is a sense in which
the public argument test may sit more easily in
Washington than in Westminster.5)
Baehler is prompted to put the question as a result of
Gregory’s position on the relevance of  policy analysis.
Ostensibly, Gregory’s view is that in order to be relevant
– which Baehler interprets as meaning being capable
of ‘swaying policy makers and carrying the day
politically’ (Baehler, 2005, p.4), policy analysis – and
presumably by extension the officials who produce it
– must be able to engage with:
the dark recesses of political motivation, not only
where hidden agendas need to be rationalised
by publicly acceptable justifications, but where
ultimate motivation depends far less on logical
reasoning and much more on tacit beliefs and
convictions (Gregory, 2004, p.302. cited in
Baehler, 2005, p.4).
Baehler duly demurs, suggesting that any attempt to
‘connect analysis to the complex, untidy, and usually
opaque domain of  political motivation’ (Gregory, 2004,
p.303; cited in Baehler, 2005, p.4) must necessarily
diminish the capacity of  public servants to serve future
governments in an impartial and professional manner.
It is not clear to us that this is, in fact, what Gregory is
saying. Our reading of  Gregory’s case is that he is simply
4 The questionnaire was a 68-item instrument comprising a composite
measure of officials’ disposition towards ministerial advisers, and
a mix of forced-choice and open-ended questions. With the
considerable assistance of the Leadership Development Centre, it
was distributed to 546 senior officials (i.e. tier 1-4) in 20 government
departments and the New Zealand Police, who have or have had at
some point since 1990 contact with ministerial advisers. We had a
response rate of 34.4% (n=188). Just on 3.8% of respondents were
chief executives; 26.3% were tier 2 officials; 57.5% were tier 3
officials, and the balance tier 4 or other officials. For a more
detailed analysis of results, see Eichbaum and Shaw (2005).
5 On this matter we have reservations about the application of ‘public
argument advising’ within a Westminster system of government.
Baehler asserts that ‘the policy advice supplied to the fourth Labour
government was a stellar example of public argument advising’
(2005: 5). The rejoinder to this is to pose the question: Was this
kind of ‘advising’ consistent with the constitutional obligations and
responsibilities attendant upon the Westminster conventions within
which the public service must operate? Moreover, in the absence
of the constitutional and institutional checks and balances that
have been instituted since the days of the fourth Labour government
(MMP being the most obvious, but changes to the Cabinet Manual
and the Step by Step guide being no less significant for the public
service), one might advance the argument that the constitutional
obligations on the public service, and more specifically the need to
tender free, frank and comprehensive advice were all the more
pressing at the time of the fourth Labour government. Indeed, the
demand for greater contestability in policy advice may be seen as
a reaction against public argument advising, and the move to MMP
may be seen as providing a constitutional buffer against an
administrative and political executive that was selective in
proposing, and far too efficient in disposing. Put somewhat starkly,
we have serious doubts that ‘public argument advising’ is consistent
with the Westminster notion of a ‘constitutional bureaucracy’.
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raising questions regarding the likely efficacy of any
policy analysis which is predicated upon the assumption
that, by virtue of its ‘rationality’, it will be listened to
and acted on by political decision-makers. He does not
seem to be calling for public servants to connect the
political dots. Rather, he is making the point that the
political context of decision-making is such that there
is no necessary causal relationship between policy analysis
and the decisions which such analysis informs. Which
raises the question we wish to address here: within
existing institutional arrangements in New Zealand, is it
possible to reconcile the politics of policy-making and
the imperatives of  public service impartiality?
The theoretical case for ministerial
advisers
Enter the ministerial adviser.
In the universe of executive government, ministerial
advisers tend to hover in a close orbit around their
ministers. While on occasion this may be perceived as
having ramifications for public servants which are less
than helpful, it also represents an opportunity, or
perhaps a resource, for officials who work in an
intensely political environment but who must do so
without being burnt.
The core of the case for ministerial advisers is that precisely
because they interpolate themselves between ministers and
officials, they are able to help the latter understand the political
motives and preferences of  the former without having to
second-guess them. In the words of one of our respondents,
ministerial advisers can happily ‘go places officials cannot
go’ (011). These places – negotiations around the formation
of a government, conversations amongst coalition partners,
relations between minority governments and parliamentary
support parties, and so on – may be off limits to officials
(unless otherwise authorised by the minister), but our
respondents indicated that an understanding of them is
tremendously useful to officials.
In other words, a good ministerial adviser can
diminish the need for guesswork on the part of public
servants by clarifying the minister’s wishes, and by
‘provid[ing] useful advice on the minister’s
commitments and priorities, which helps in deciding
what issues to bring to a minister’s attention’ (025).
Clearly, a ministerial adviser’s views on what counts
should not dissuade officials from raising other issues
they feel the minister ought to be made aware of. The
point is that the adviser’s contribution allows officials
to exercise their judgment on such matters at one
remove: i.e. the former functions as a sort of  insulation
device, absorbing or deflecting the political heat so
that the latter can get on with the business of providing
advice in a free, frank and fearless manner.6
That is not to understate the risk that by occupying the
space between ministers and their officials, advisers can
distort instructions from the former to the latter, and
‘contaminate’ the advice from the latter to the former.
Indeed, one of our respondents reported having
experienced ‘increasing pressure on departmental staff
to capitulate to particular political positions and write
advice supportive of such positions’ (006).
On the other hand, ministerial advisers can shield officials
from pressures which might otherwise result in
politicisation. As Lynelle Briggs, the Australian public
service commissioner, has noted, across the Tasman it
is increasingly recognised that political staff can reduce
the chances of  ministers asking public servants ‘to do
things that are verging on the political’ (Briggs, 2005:
7). (What is not explained is the curious – to us, anyway
– practice at the federal level of drawing ministers’
political staff  directly from the Australian public service,
and allowing them to return there once the tour of
duty is finished.) Much the same point was made by
one of  our respondents, who suggested that ministerial
advisers can ‘help ensure this [political] dimension is
part of  the decision-making process and, in doing so,
help keep departments apolitical’ (087).
There are risks here, including that officials are left
unclear as to the extent to which an adviser is
conveying the minister’s wishes rather than simply
communicating their own interpretation of what should
be done. Robust procedures and clear protocols
amongst ministers, chief executives and ministerial
advisers can go some way to guarding against this
risk, as might greater codification of the nature of
the delegations ministers can make, as occurs in the
UK. It is in the nature of things, however, that the
risk can never be fully banished.
As an aside, it should not be assumed that ministerial
advisers are only possessed of  ulterior motives. The
6 It is drawing a rather long bow, admittedly, but the function is not
unlike that served by the arrangements which mediated contact
between the public service and the political parties in negotiations
following the 1996 general election.
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rational choice presumption of self-interest has
fallen from the giddy heights of orthodoxy it
occupied in the latter part of  the 20th century, now
that we’re all aware of  the methodological flaws
and predictive shortcomings associated with it. In
our view, that uniquely arid explanation of  the
motives of social actors should not be exhumed
and deployed to impute exclusively nefarious
motives to ministerial advisers. It is certainly not
unreasonable to infer – from the very nature of
the job – a partisan inclination. It is unreasonable,
however, to proceed from first principles to a
conclusion that self-interest motivates all conduct
by ministerial advisers. In fact, there is a good deal
of evidence from our respondents to the effect that
relationships between advisers and officials are in
the main collaborative rather than competitive; and
mutually beneficial – from the point of view of
the quality of advice they jointly work on – rather
than zero-sum. Indeed, it may be argued – and this
is at the core of debates over the accountability of
ministerial advisers – that both advisers and officials
share a duty pro bono publico.
In any event, whatever the threats ministerial
advisers pose to officials – and we certainly do not
dismiss them – they should not blind us to the
possibility that, in certain circumstances, the roles
of minister ia l  advisers and off ic ia ls  are
complementary: partisan dimension + professional
expertise = policy advice which is informed,
reflexive and cognisant of  political realities.
So much for the case for a better press for advisers.
What evidence is there, if  any, which demonstrates that
the complementarity we propose is anything other than
a naïve theoretical construct?
The empirical case for ministerial
advisers
It seems reasonable to propose that certain
preconditions must exist in order for the sort of
relationship we are asserting to exist. These might
include a fair measure of contact between the two
parties; working relationships which are on the whole
functional; and a sense amongst officials that advisers
have a legitimate contribution to offer.
As it happens, there is a good deal of contact between
senior officials and ministerial advisers (Table 1). That
in itself will come as little surprise, and is consistent
with the anecdotal evidence to that effect which has
been about for some years now. To some extent it is
likely simply to be a function of the increase in the
number of  ministerial advisers. It may also speak to
officials’ growing willingness to engage as advisers have
increasingly gained the requisite experience, identified
those areas in which they can add value, and sharpened
their contributions.
In addition, the data in Table 1 probably reflect the
increasing seniority of our respondents over time. Other
things being equal, the more senior an individual becomes,
the more likely he or she is to come into contact with
ministerial advisers. However, although our data don’t
allow us to control for individuals’ career paths, even
when all public servants other than those with 21 years of
service or more are excluded from calculations, thereby
restricting analysis to the only cohort in the study which
has had the opportunity to be in contact with each
government since 1990, the overall trend is clearly towards
greater contact with ministerial advisers.
Those caveats aside, the extent of the contact reported
by our respondents, and the rate at which its frequency
has increased in the last decade or so, are worth briefly
1990-93 1993-96 1996-99 1999-02 2002-05
very frequent 7.3% 11.2% 9.7% 19.4% 24.4%
frequent 11.9 14.4 19 27.7 33.7
occasional 17.4 17.8 26.3 29 27.9
rare 18.3 18.1 20.1 14 11.6
never 45 37.9 24.8 9 2.3
N 109 114 129 155 172
Table 1: Contact between officials and ministerial advisers7
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pausing on. Just under 20% of respondents reported
having had either frequent or very frequent contact with
ministerial advisers during the fourth National
government (1990-93). That figure has since nearly
trebled to 58.1% (2002-05). Looked at another way,
where 45% of respondents recall having no contact at
all with ministerial advisers 15 or so years ago, only
2.3% say that that is the case these days.
This familiarity does not, however, seem to have bred
contempt: fully 70.1% of respondents agreed or
strongly agreed with the proposition that ‘ministerial
advisers are a legitimate feature of executive
government’ (17.9% neither agreed nor disagreed, while
only 4.9% took issue with the statement).8
By acknowledging this status, our respondents may also
have been ceding the presence of ministerial advisers
in a domain over which officials have traditionally
enjoyed a near-monopoly. But rather than resisting this
development, most seem to be getting on and making
the best of  things. Indeed, when asked to describe the
state of their personal relationships with ministerial
advisers, over two-thirds (72.7%) of respondents
described matters as generally positive. Only 4.8%
indicated that, overall, things weren’t going that well,
while a sizeable minority (22.4%) reserved judgement
on the issue.9
At least in the experience of our respondents, then, the
broad preconditions for a functional relationship between
officials and ministerial advisers appear to be in place.
Whether or not they are sufficient is clearly another matter,
although a more detailed exploration of what
respondents had to say suggests that they may well be.
Participants’ responses to two clusters of questions are
especially apposite here. The first asked for their views
on whether the advent of ministerial advisers is a positive
or negative development. While 57.9% regarded it as
positive, only 8.7% saw it as a negative (and 33.3%
were undecided).10 When invited to elaborate at greater
length, those who feel positively about advisers tended
to make observations which clustered around two
themes. The first is that ministerial advisers help keep
officials away from the overtly partisan aspects of
policy-making. The following two comments largely
sum up this type of response:
[Ministerial advisers] are able to undertake
negotiations and broker agreements on
legislation that would compromise the political
neutrality of  officials. If  they do this supported
by advice from officials that provides a
‘negotiating brief ’, this can be a very valuable
role. (086)
Ministerial advisers are important in ensuring
departments understand ministers’ expectations
and views. They provide clarity and a degree
of transparency which is important to achieving
good communication between departments and
ministers. They also provide a mechanism to
reinforce the distinction between departmental
and political advice if ministers so choose. (041)
Suggestive of  the importance of  MMP, responses of
this kind tended to come arm-in-arm with observations
regarding the value ministerial advisers add in the sorts
of policy-making conditions generated under the
current electoral arrangements. For instance, many more
senior officials agree that ministerial advisers make a
positive contribution under multi-party and/or minority
conditions than disagree with this (52.6% vs. 7.3%);
equally, more agree that advisers play a positive role in
facilitating relations between minority governments and
their parliamentary support parties than do not (42.9%
vs. 3.4%).11
The second (and related) theme concerns respondents’
perceptions of the contribution ministerial advisers
make to the policy process. Some of  the literature on
this issue is sceptical that advisers have much to offer at
all (see Anderson, 2005; Mountfield, 2002; Tiernan,
2005). But over half (52.2%) of our respondents agreed
or strongly agreed that the contribution made by
ministerial advisers is a positive one: only 10.3%
disagreed to a greater or lesser extent that this is so, and
the remaining 37.5% sat on the fence.12
7 Respondents were asked to indicate frequency of contact on a
five-point scale: very frequent; frequent; occasional; rare; never.
The data for (a) 1993-96 and (b) 1996-99 are averages of the
contact reported for the following governments: (a) National (Nov.
1993-Sept. 1994); National/right of centre (Sept. 1994-Aug. 1995);
National (Aug. 1995-Feb. 1996); National/United (Feb. 1996-Dec.
1996); (b) National/New Zealand First (Dec. 1996-Aug. 1998);
National/Independents (Aug. 1998-Nov. 1999).
8 n=184; missing=4.
9 n=165; missing=23.
10 n=183; missing=5.
11 The percentage of respondents who neither agreed nor disagreed
with these two statements was 40.2% and 53.7% respectively.
12 n=184; missing=4.
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Again, when pushed on the particulars of that
contribution, responses could be grouped into various
categories. For 6.2% of  respondents the injection of  an
element of contestability into the policy process is the
key contribution made by ministerial advisers. Some have
had negative experiences of this, in which ‘advisers have
blocked advice from officials to ministers,
compromising the policy process’ (147); others are of
the more positive view that advisers are able to ‘provide
a “reality check” for options presented by officials’ (151).
Other comments drew attention to the political
perspective which ministerial advisers bring to the policy
table. If it is the case that advisers care little for the
niceties of the policy process, then one might expect
observations from officials in which the terms
‘politicisation’ and ‘political perspective’ are essentially
interchangeable. And while there certainly were
accounts of obstructive conduct by advisers, officials
also volunteered that:
[Ministerial advisers] can facilitate the flow of
information to and from busy ministers,
exercising judgment and synthesising
information so that ministers can be informed
efficiently and in an up to date way. [Advisers]
can integrate information from different
sources, which aids ministers, but can also help
to inform the policy process by incorporating
different perspectives. (179)
[Ministerial advisers] can provide clear guidance
of what is acceptable to the minister so
unacceptable options are not pursued. [They]
assist in establishing the policy programme
between ministers and departments. (023)
The most significant role of ministerial advisers
in the policy process is their role in relaying and
clarifying ministers’ expectations and views to
senior departmental managers. Clear and blunt
explanations about ministers’ opinions and
interpretation of issues is invaluable for senior
staff, in particular. (041)
Conclusion
In this brief contribution we have consciously sought
to make a particular point, which is that there are aspects
of  the ministerial adviser’s role which can facilitate, rather
than hinder, the core constitutional function of the
public service.
That does not blind us to other, less positive
dimensions of the relationship between advisers and
officials. As noted by a number of  commentators
(James, 2002; Mountfield, 2002; Scott, 2005;
Wintringham, 2002), relations between ministerial
advisers and public servants can be fraught. Much of
that stems from the core raison d’etre of ministerial
advisers. Thus, some of  our respondents reported
experiences in which advisers failed to convey advice
to ministers, intervened inappropriately in the
relationship between a minister and officials, or delayed
the release of departments’ policy initiatives which
advisers felt were politically unfavourable.
We are conscious, too, that although we have chosen to
focus in this paper on the nexus between officials and
ministerial advisers, ministers themselves are central to
the playing out of relationships within the executive.
For one thing, their expectations can determine the
particular work a ministerial adviser undertakes. Thus:
some ministers use their advisers just for certain
issues, some for all areas of the portfolio; some
take a co-ordination role, others are elbow deep
in policy development; some work closely with
officials, others independently. [It] depends on the
relationship between ministers and advisers. (034)
Ministers can also set the tone of relations between
advisers and officials. Indeed, many of  our respondents
stressed the point that functional, productive relationships
in ministerial offices depend far more on the aptitude
of ministers than they do on the disposition of either
advisers or officials. In particular, experienced, senior
ministers are felt to be ‘as aware of their advisers’ foibles
as of [those of] officials’ (011), and can therefore ensure
that relations within the office are managed in an even-
handed manner. Conversely, junior and/or less capable
ministers sometimes fail to discriminate between the
respective roles and responsibilities of advisers and
officials. As one respondent put it:
Capable ministers are more able to ‘arms-length’
the political decisions from the provision of
objective advice, and understand the value of
such an approach. Poor ministers give almost
unbridled power to ministerial advisers. (006)
As ever, it is often a bit of both. Some officials have
had contact with both ‘highly opinionated and deceitful
advisers who were a danger to the policy process [and]
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very able and skilled advisers who could very insightfully
guide issues and spot difficulties/broker solutions ‘(031).
Others explained that while advisers ‘can add value by
inserting viewpoints that might be overlooked by public
sector advisers, they [can] also inhibit the policy process
by seeking to rule out options deemed politically
unacceptable’ (081).
Our purpose has not been to come down firmly on
one side of  the fence or the other. Neither has it been
to suggest that the advent of  ministerial advisers has
somehow diminished the need for officials to be
appropriately sensitive to the political contexts in which
they offer advice.
Instead, it has been to propose that, other things being
equal, ministerial advisers can be of use to officials
in assisting them to make sense of and negotiate the
fluid contours of the political landscape. In short,
they may be part of a wider response to the challenge
of connecting ‘[policy] analysis to the complex,
untidy, and usually opaque domain of  political
motivation’ (Gregory, 2004: 303). Further, we find
it telling that amongst senior advisers themselves –
those ostensibly at most risk from the predations of
ministerial advisers – there are clear signs of support
for this view.
At another level, we are making the case that ministerial
advisers can no longer be left out of studies of the
core executive. They are here in numbers; many more
senior officials are having much more contact with them
than was the case even two parliamentary terms ago;
and the indications are that they are accepted by many
senior officials as a legitimate feature of executive
government.
If these are the circumstances practitioners are reporting,
it is incumbent upon scholars to better understand the
effects and influence of ministerial advisers on relations
within government. Properly illuminating the
circumstances of policy-making within the
contemporary New Zealand state sector requires this.
And, as Scott observes, in a normative sense, creating
additional value in policy analysis and advising requires
public sector advisers to network with ‘other key
contributors to public policy analysis and advising (Scott,
2005: 14). Looking ahead, more effective networking
within the core executive is clearly seen by our
respondents as a key element in good Westminster-styled
governance.
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